---
title: "Cybersecurity and International Law: State Sovereignty, Tallinn Manual, and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction"
date: 2025-08-11
canonical: "https://codeandcypher.com/papers/csol540-cybersecurity-and-international-law-case-analysis/"
author: "Joshua A. Wortz"
institution: "University of San Diego"

report_type: "Academic Research Paper / CSOL540"
doi: "10.5281/zenodo.22287617"
pdf_url: "https://codeandcypher.com/papers/csol540-cybersecurity-and-international-law-case-analysis.pdf"
description: "International law analysis applying the Tallinn Manual, state sovereignty, and rules of engagement to nation-state cyber warfare."
---

# Cybersecurity and International Law: State Sovereignty, Tallinn Manual, and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction

**Author:** Joshua A. Wortz, MSCOL, CISSP ([ORCID: 0009-0003-6722-1019](https://orcid.org/0009-0003-6722-1019))  
**Institution:** University of San Diego  
**Publication Date:** August 11, 2025  
**DOI:** [10.5281/zenodo.22287617](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22287617)  
**PDF Download:** [Full Research Paper PDF](https://codeandcypher.com/papers/csol540-cybersecurity-and-international-law-case-analysis.pdf)  

---

## Abstract

The growing reliance on interconnected technology ecosystems has magnified the risk of large-scale cyber incidents that transcend national borders. These risks extend beyond traditional cybercrime to sophisticated state-sponsored espionage campaigns targeting both government and private sector networks. One of the most prominent examples is the SolarWinds cyber espionage campaign, uncovered in December 2020. This incident demonstrated the vulnerabilities of global supply chains, the difficulties of enforcing cybersecurity laws across jurisdictions, and the challenges of mounting a coordinated international response.

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## Research Paper Body

### Introduction
The growing reliance on interconnected technology ecosystems has magnified the risk of 
large-scale cyber incidents that transcend national borders. These risks extend beyond traditional 
cybercrime to sophisticated state-sponsored espionage campaigns targeting both government and 
private sector networks. One of the most prominent examples is the SolarWinds cyber espionage 
campaign, uncovered in December 2020. This incident demonstrated the vulnerabilities of global 
supply chains, the difficulties of enforcing cybersecurity laws across jurisdictions, and the 
challenges of mounting a coordinated international response.
This paper examines the SolarWinds case as a lens through which to explore the 
application of international cybersecurity law, jurisdictional barriers, and global cooperation 
mechanisms. The analysis draws upon the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, the Tallinn 
Manual 2.0, the United Nations Charter, and modern trade agreements with cybersecurity 
provisions. It also evaluates lessons learned from the perspective of a Chief Information Security 
Officer (CISO) and offers policy recommendations to strengthen international cybersecurity 
governance.
Case Study Summary
The SolarWinds attack began in early 2020 when advanced threat actors—later attributed 
to Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), also known as APT29 or Cozy Bear—
compromised the build environment for SolarWinds’ Orion platform. By injecting malicious 
code into Orion updates between March and June 2020, they created the SUNBURST backdoor, 
which was digitally signed and distributed to approximately 18,000 customers. Because these

updates were delivered through SolarWinds’ legitimate update mechanism, the malicious code 
bypassed typical security measures.
The attack was discovered in December 2020 when cybersecurity firm FireEye detected 
suspicious activity in its systems and traced it back to the Orion platform. This discovery 
revealed that victims included the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Department of 
Commerce, the Department of the Treasury, and other federal agencies. Outside the United 
States, entities in Canada, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Israel, and the United Arab Emirates 
were also affected. Impacted organizations spanned critical infrastructure sectors, including 
telecommunications, healthcare, and energy (Coco, 2022).
Technically, the SUNBURST malware was a well-engineered reconnaissance tool that 
allowed attackers to move laterally within networks, escalate privileges, and exfiltrate sensitive 
data without triggering standard detection systems. Unlike destructive attacks such as NotPetya, 
SolarWinds was designed for stealth and persistence. From a geopolitical perspective, it aligned 
with traditional espionage objectives but raised concerns due to its scale and the exploitation of a 
trusted supply chain channel (Just Security, 2020).
Legal Implications
Relevant International Laws and Agreements
The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime is the primary binding international treaty 
addressing cybercrime investigation and cooperation. It criminalizes unauthorized access, system 
interference, and misuse of devices while promoting evidence-sharing and extradition among 
signatories. However, Russia is not a signatory, and thus was under no legal obligation to assist

in the investigation or extradition, severely limiting the Convention’s practical utility in this case 
(Council of Europe, 2001).
The Tallinn Manual 2.0 offers non-binding guidance on applying existing international 
law to cyber operations. Rule 4 emphasizes respect for sovereignty, and Rule 32 notes that cyber 
espionage generally does not violate international law unless it causes prohibited effects, such as 
damage to critical infrastructure or injury to persons (Schmitt, 2017). Because SolarWinds did 
not cause kinetic damage or loss of life, its classification as an unlawful “use of force” under 
international law is contested.
The UN Charter prohibits the “use of force” against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of states (Article 2(4)) and allows self-defense in the case of an “armed attack” 
(United Nations, 1945, Article 51). The SolarWinds intrusion, while serious, did not meet the 
armed attack threshold, thus limiting U.S. and allied responses to lawful countermeasures like 
sanctions and diplomatic expulsions (UN, 1945).
Modern trade agreements, such as the U.S.–Mexico–Canada Agreement (USMCA) and 
the U.S.–Japan Digital Trade Agreement, include cybersecurity cooperation provisions that 
encourage capacity building, information sharing, and incident response collaboration. However, 
these agreements are primarily forward-looking and were not designed to address incidents 
involving a non-party state actor refusing cooperation.
Jurisdictional Challenges
Attribution remains a fundamental challenge in prosecuting cross-border cyber incidents. 
While the U.S. intelligence community attributed the SolarWinds attack to the SVR, meeting the

evidentiary standards for international prosecution requires access to detailed forensic data—
much of which resides within the territory of the alleged perpetrator state. Without extradition 
agreements or mutual legal assistance treaties (MLATs) with Russia, prosecution was infeasible. 
Additionally, privacy and surveillance laws vary significantly across jurisdictions, complicating 
evidence gathering even among allies.
These issues echo the Module 7 learning outcome regarding jurisdictional complexity: national 
laws differ in their definitions of cybercrime, evidence admissibility, and investigative authority, 
creating barriers to unified enforcement.
International Collaboration and Response
The private sector drove the initial response. FireEye’s disclosure and Microsoft’s 
technical analysis provided the foundation for broader mitigation efforts. The U.S. Cybersecurity 
and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) issued Emergency Directive 21-01, directing federal 
agencies to disconnect affected Orion products (CISA, 2020). The FBI, NSA, and Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) formed a Cyber Unified Coordination Group to 
coordinate the response.
Internationally, the United Kingdom’s National Cyber Security Centre, Canada’s 
Communications Security Establishment, and Australia’s Cyber Security Centre issued joint 
advisories. However, no central global body coordinated these efforts, and responses varied in 
scope and timing. The lack of a unified legal mechanism for cross-border investigation limited 
the depth of information sharing.

Russia denied involvement and did not participate in any cooperative investigative 
processes. This refusal underscored the limitations of current international law in compelling 
cooperation from a non-signatory, adversarial state.
Legal and Diplomatic Consequences
In April 2021, the United States imposed sanctions on Russia, citing the SolarWinds 
campaign among other malicious cyber activities (White House, 2021). These sanctions included 
the expulsion of ten Russian diplomats and restrictions on certain Russian technology 
companies. While lawful under international law as acts of retorsion, these measures did not 
deter future Russian cyber operations, illustrating the limited deterrent effect of current 
diplomatic tools in the cyber domain.
Lessons Learned as a CISO
Supply Chain Risk Management
Organizations must recognize that vendor compromise can be as dangerous as a direct 
breach. This requires thorough vendor security assessments, contractual security requirements, 
and use of Software Bills of Materials (SBOMs) to track dependencies.
Zero Trust Architecture
Trust should never be assumed, even for internal systems. Implementing least-privilege 
principles, segmentation, and continuous verification can limit attacker movement once inside.
Incident Response Preparedness

Incident response plans should account for multi-jurisdictional coordination, including 
pre-established channels with international partners and private sector intelligence-sharing 
organizations.
Threat Intelligence Integration
Timely integration of threat intelligence from sources such as Information Sharing and 
Analysis Centers (ISACs) can speed detection and mitigation of sophisticated attacks.
Leadership and Communication
During a crisis, transparent communication with stakeholders—including customers, 
regulators, and the public—is essential. A CISO must also manage internal morale, maintain 
trust in security teams, and ensure continuous improvement after the incident.
Policy Recommendations
1. Expand Budapest Convention Membership
 Encouraging major cyber powers outside the Convention to join would standardize 
cooperation, expedite evidence sharing, and create formal investigative channels.
2. Establish a UN-Led Cyber Attribution Mechanism
 A neutral, expert-driven body could assess evidence, attribute attacks with high 
confidence, and issue public reports that carry international legitimacy.
3. Harmonize Evidence Standards
 Aligning evidentiary procedures across jurisdictions would reduce delays caused by 
incompatible legal systems, enabling faster collaborative responses.

4. Enhance Supply Chain Security Requirements
 Mandating SBOMs, secure development lifecycle adherence, and regular third-party 
audits would reduce the risk of software supply chain compromise.
5. Update Tallinn Manual Guidance
 Clarifying when large-scale espionage campaigns targeting critical infrastructure rise to 
the level of sovereignty violations or prohibited intervention would help guide lawful 
state responses.
6. Create Bilateral and Multilateral Rapid Response Protocols
 Formalizing cross-border cyber incident protocols, modeled on NATO’s cooperative 
cyber defense framework, would enable faster, coordinated responses to global-scale 
incidents.
### Conclusion
The SolarWinds cyber espionage campaign revealed deep vulnerabilities in both the 
technical fabric of global supply chains and the legal frameworks intended to govern state 
behavior in cyberspace. While current instruments like the Budapest Convention and Tallinn 
Manual provide some structure, they fall short in cases involving non-signatory, state-sponsored 
actors. Addressing these gaps will require expanding treaty participation, harmonizing evidence-
sharing laws, and establishing rapid response mechanisms that transcend political divisions. 
Without these reforms, the international community will remain reactive rather than proactive in 
the face of future large-scale cyber intrusions.

### References
CISA. (2020, December 13). Emergency directive 21-01: Mitigate SolarWinds Orion 
code compromise. Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency. 
https://www.cisa.gov/ed2101
Coco, A. (2022). Illegal: The SolarWinds hack under international law. European Journal 
of International Law, 33(4), 1275–1303. https://doi.org/10.1093/ejil/chac077
Council of Europe. (2001). Convention on Cybercrime (ETS No. 185). 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list?module=treaty-detail&treatynum=185
Just Security. (2020, December 18). Russia’s SolarWinds operation and international law. 
https://www.justsecurity.org/73946/russias-solarwinds-operation-and-international-law/
Schmitt, M. N. (Ed.). (2017). Tallinn manual 2.0 on the international law applicable to 
cyber operations. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524
United Nations. (1945). Charter of the United Nations. 
https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter
White House. (2021, April 15). Executive Order on blocking property with respect to 
specified harmful foreign activities of the Government of the Russian Federation. The 
White House. 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/presidential-actions/2021/04/15/executive-
order-on-blocking-property-with-respect-to-specified-harmful-foreign-activities-of-the-
government-of-the-russian-federation/


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> **Archival Artifact:** The complete, formatted research publication can be accessed directly as a PDF at [https://codeandcypher.com/papers/csol540-cybersecurity-and-international-law-case-analysis.pdf](https://codeandcypher.com/papers/csol540-cybersecurity-and-international-law-case-analysis.pdf).


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## Citation (APA 7th Edition)
Wortz, J. A. (2025). *Cybersecurity and International Law: State Sovereignty, Tallinn Manual, and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction*. Code and Cypher. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.22287617
